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1 Introduction
The optimal long-term contract in repeated moral hazard generally exhibits memory (Lambert 1983,
Rogerson 1985 and Chiappori et al. 1994). With repeated contracts the principal is able to learn from the
agent’s past history and, hence, to propose a long-term contract that internalizes this information over
time. The benefit is that risk sharing is improved. A natural application of long-term contracting is in
financial intermediation where asymmetric information is a key problem (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981, 1983).
Banks tend to maintain durable relationships with clients of established reputation. It has been proved
that, as a result of memory, a long-term credit contract benefits the borrower in the form of lower interest
rates and fewer collateral demands (Boot and Thakor 1994). Other models, however, predict that the
duration of the bank-borrower relationship in fact increases the borrowing cost because its benefits also
create for the borrower switching costs in starting a new relationship with a competitor (Greenbaum
et al. 1989 and Sharpe 1990). The advantages of the reduction in asymmetric information, in this
specific bilateral relationship through memory, would thus be offset by the market power gained by the
bank. These conflicting predictions are reproduced by the empirical literature. Berger and Udell (1995)
and Bodenhorn (2003) find a negative relationship between duration of the bank-borrower relationship
and borrowing cost or collateral demands. Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) find, in contrast, that the
loan rate increases with the duration of the bank-borrower relationship. Neither result is confirmed by
other studies in which no statistically significant correlation is obtained (Blackwell and Winters 1997,
Petersen and Rajan 1994, Cole 1998 and Elsas and Krahnen 1998). This inconclusive empirical evidence
illustrates that the borrowing cost may not only be a function of duration but also of other factors.
Borrowing cost tends to increase with the amount of credit, the riskiness of the project and market
power but tends to decrease with competition. In addition, banks use the borrowing cost to screen
borrowers and to eliminate the ones with the highest probability of default. Borrowing cost is therefore
an instrument that can deal with both adverse selection and moral hazard (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981).
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The reputation effect is thus difficult to capture.
We argue that the method used so far by the empirical literature on this subject is flawed as it
pools all firms whatever the duration (or frequency or intensity) of the relationship with their bank,
and estimates the effect of duration on the borrowing cost. The problem is that the borrowing cost
can vary between firms not only because of the duration of the relationship but also as a result of the
banks’ screening policy. In other words, this method is unable to disentangle the effects of competition
and asymmetric information, which in turn prevents us from identifying the effect of memory.
The present paper proposes a different empirical strategy to overcome this problem. First of all,
in common with the rest of the literature, we focus on one single bank to control for unobserved
heterogeneity in lending policy. We build an original database from data made public by the London-
based European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) on all its investments in private
and public firms during the first years of its life (1991-2003).1 Second, our dataset allows us to split it
into two subsamples: firms that have signed one single contract and firms that have signed more than
one contract. In so doing, we control somewhat for the screening effect. In both subsamples, the amount
of lending and the type of contract set for each firm’s first contract reflect the screening policy of the
bank. In the subpopulation of several-contract firms information on the firms’ past actions obviously
exists. The question is: will the bank use it? We run regressions for each of the two subsamples. If
the same results are obtained, this means that the bank does not use the past history of its clients in
designing contracts. Our results clearly show that this is not the case. The total project value of the
first signed contract (but not of the following ones) is neatly identified as the dominant individual fixed
effect in the design of contracts for firms that have signed more than one.
This result could, however, be driven by the effect of competition. The bank could in fact offer
better lending conditions to its long-term clients in order to prevent them from going to competitors.
The specificity of the EBRD enables us to rule out this possibility. The EBRD was created in 1991
1Any local or foreign firm is eligible for EBRD financing.
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just after the Soviet Bloc had collapsed. Its purpose was to assist the countries of that region in
transforming their centrally-planned economic systems into market economies. When the EBRD started
its lending operations in 1991, the business environment of all these countries was characterized by
large output fall, complete disorganization of production, macroeconomic and political instability and
an inadequate banking sector. This exceptional situation makes the EBRD experience an interesting
natural experiment for two reasons. First, the management of risk had to be carried out in a very
uncertain environment. The country risk was high owing to the macroeconomic turmoil. Furthermore,
all potential borrowers lacked market experience and had no history of creditworthiness. Second, the
decisions made by the EBRD were not affected by competition because local banks were insolvent and
foreign banks did not enter these risky markets in the early transition period. Moreover, the public
shareholders of the EBRD assigned the bank the mission to lead the financial flows to these countries
and not to crowd out private investments. The EBRD was therefore in a situation of monopoly.
The monopolistic behavior of the EBRD offers ideal conditions to test memory in long-term credit
contracting. Our estimations yield unambiguous results, validating the predictions that reputation is
the dominant device in screening clients.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 focuses on the main theoretical
contributions studying the bank-client relationship. Section 3 characterizes the model of the EBRD-
client relationship. The data and descriptive statistics are presented in Section 4. Section 5 presents
the econometric method and results and section 6 concludes.
2 The choice of contract
The choice of the optimal contract between a lender and a borrower has been widely studied. Asym-
metric information is the major source of risk between the two counterparts, and it is very difficult to
control for. The lender aims at defining a device that allows her (i) to distinguish the good (solvent)
4
borrower from the bad one and (ii) to choose the right incentives to force the borrower to put as much
effort as possible into the completion of the investment project for which credit is demanded. Therefore,
the problem turns out to be the sum of various dimensions of uncertainty and imperfect information.
In a framework accounting for the repeated moral hazard problem between borrowers and lenders,
Boot et al. (1991) conclude that, for borrowers with a good reputation, there is a unique equilibrium, in
which each borrower is offered an unsecured loan contract. In contrast, borrowers with a bad reputation
are offered a secured contract with collateral that is lost only upon default. When private information on
borrower type is added, the problem turns out to be of an adverse selection type: agents are required to
self-report. If borrower quality and effort are substitutes, low-quality borrowers post collateral in order
to commit to higher effort. This action reduces the likelihood of default of low-quality borrowers but
it still remains higher than that of the high-borrower quality. As a consequence, there is a deadweight
loss associated with collateral. The private information problem accentuates the relationship between
collateral requirements and borrower risk (already present in moral hazard problems). In the empirical
test that Boot et al. (1991) propose, a key result deserves attention: a decrease in collateral costs or
an increase in loan size yields a lower utilization of collateral at equilibrium. Larger loans are more
likely to have a lower level of collateral as well as loans with longer maturity. The size of the loan can
be interpreted as a signal of borrower quality. Other factors occurring in the client—bank relationship
can also be interpreted as signals of the quality of the borrower, such as the structure of the contracts
signed by the two counterparts. A bank can usually discriminate between clients by proposing different
contracts to them. The contracts can be grouped by type according to their ‘nature’ but, nevertheless,
each of them is often tailored to the client’s needs.
Looking at the most widespread class of contracts, Inderst and Mueller (2006) investigate the op-
timality of debt versus equity contracts. Debt contracts are optimal when the lender is conservative
and equity contracts are optimal when aggressive. Debt contracts are suitable for financing profitable
projects that are likely to break even on public information alone, while less profitable projects are
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financed with equity. In addition, debts are proven to mitigate moral hazard and other problems that
arise from asymmetric information. For instance, investments by small firms in tangible assets such as
equipment or properties are expected to be financed with debts. Furthermore, these authors analyze the
sub-optimality of a lender’s decision to propose a contract (to a potential borrower) by choosing it from
a menu of contracts after having observed (ex-ante) a public signal. The menu choice always creates a
problem because a lender would always choose a contract ex-post optimal for her. Nevertheless, given
that the lender optimally restricts herself to a single contract to avoid ex-post self-dealing, it is optimal
to offer a single contract that the client accepts or rejects on the basis of the contract’s conditions.
There is no adjustment of the loan terms after the screening, and this guarantees the optimality of the
decision. The authors provide empirical evidence supporting this result. Loans are often granted at
standardized terms and borrowers, in particular small firms, are often charged with the same rate of
interest (because of an implicit same risk premium).
The screening process is a key tool for discriminating between clients but it is a real burden for the
bank (Manove et al., 2001). The process is costly, especially in a perfect competitive setting. Therefore,
a bank always has a strong interest in proposing a contract with a high level of collateral and avoiding
the screening stage. In this way, it is sure to discard low types. Manove et al. (2001) focus on the
screening cost in the case where a bank is a monopolist in the credit market. The result shows that
there is a big difference with respect to the standard competitive structure. In the case of a monopolistic
bank, the bank’s optimal strategy is to offer one unique contract and then to screen all projects. The
motivation is straightforward: the structure of the credit market makes the demand quite inelastic and
high interest rates do not lower the borrowing volume. The important factor is the market power of
the bank, which is efficient under the conditions of asymmetric information. Throughout the screening
process, information is generated at a cost to the bank. Therefore, the bank screens the clients, funds
the better projects and covers its costs with higher interest rates. As an additional result, the high
concentration of the credit market allows the bank to establish a closer long-term relationship with
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firms. As for the borrowers, good ones have an incentive to distinguish themselves from the others by
posting sufficient collateral. As described in the next section, the framework developed by Manove et al.
(2001) perfectly fits the behavior adopted by the EBRD. In this theoretical framework, the reputation
effect is crucial to building memory on clients, which, in the long run, turns out to be a discrimination
device.
To our knowledge, these theoretical results have not yet been tested empirically. The obvious reason
for this is that it is very difficult to identify a bank behaving as a monopolist in the credit market. The
case of the EBRD seems to be unique and can be used as a kind of natural experiment to capture the
memory effect in relation to contract terms.
3 The EBRD-client relationship
3.1 The EBRD
With a capital of 20 billion euros and being owned by sixty-one countries and two intergovernmental
institutions, the European Union and the European Investment Bank, the EBRD is a peculiar investment
bank. Its main characteristics are as follows:
- Unlike private investment banks, the EBRD has sovereign shareholders that do not receive divi-
dends.
- Its investments are geographically restricted to the region of the former Soviet Bloc.
- Unlike the World Bank, the EBRD invests mainly in private enterprises. According to our calcu-
lations, the share of public clients between 1991 and 2003 did not exceed 12.5% of the total share of
cumulated investment of 23%.
- Its investments have to respect environmental standards.
- Its mandate stipulates that it must only work in countries that are committed to democratic
principles. Nevertheless, some investments have been made in certain countries that are far from being
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Figure 1: EBRD performance (€ million) (Source: EBRD, Calculus: authors)
fully-fledged democracies.
From a theoretical point of view, we consider the objective function of the EBRD as being identical
to that of any investment bank. Its objective is to maximize profits from investment projects and to
do so by using all the instruments available on the financial markets to raise funds and to protect its
portfolio against risks.2 Figure 1 describes EBRD performance (net profits) over time.
Its constraints, however, are different. It must invest in a restricted geographic area and this pre-
cludes diversification of its portfolio with investments in safer places in the rest of the world. Therefore,
in this respect, the EBRD faces a harder constraint than any other investment bank. On the other
hand, its sovereign shareholders virtually guarantee protection against bankruptcy, which is far from
being the case for any other private investment bank. This feature together with its stable sovereign
ownership allows the EBRD to raise funds in the best conditions and, simultaneously, to face the high
risks inherent in investing in the region.
2 In fact, the objectives of the EBRD are not totally identical to those of other investment banks. The EBRD aims at
being a catalyst for financial institutions and wants to avoid crowding them out. In other words, the EBRD does not see
other financial institutions as competitors. However, in the bank-client relationship, which is our concern in this paper, its
objective is to maximize profits from its clients’ projects, i.e., in accordance with the EBRD’s statement, to apply "sound
banking principles" (EBRD, 1999).
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3.2 The types of contract granted by the EBRD
When considering a potential client for a lending contract, the bank follows a very standard procedure.
First, we consider the case of a contract running for one period. The bank and its client agree to
sign the contract; then, the bank finances the firm, which makes the investment and pays back the
loan (plus interest) to the bank.3 Second, we consider a more established bank-client relationship.
The bank grants its first contract to a firm. Then, according to the behavior shown by the client,
the bank can decide to finance or not a second project whenever the client applies for a second (or
further) contract. The problem faced by the bank therefore becomes dynamic. In a repeated contract,
two scenarios are possible depending on whether the two stages are independent or not. If the stages
are independent, the final result is the sum of the results of two one-stage games. Such a contract
is nevertheless an incomplete one. Chiappori et al. (1994) proved that a long-term relationship can
outperform a succession of day-by-day agreements if the role of memory is taken into account. To
obtain this result, the principal’s objective function must be time-separable and the current behavior
must affect the probability of the current outcome. Under these assumptions, the bank can write a
long-term renegotiation-proof contract by adapting the terms of the contract in the second period with
respect to the return of the firm’s investment in the first period. The bank, therefore, remembers the
return of the firm’s first-period investment. The structure of such a contract is optimal: neither the
principal (the bank) nor the agent (the firm) has an incentive to deviate. Our empirical exercise aims
at identifying whether and to what extent reputation has an impact on the amount of credit granted
by the bank to finance its clients’ investment projects.
3 In this section, for the sake of simplicity, we intend ‘loan’ to mean any kind of credit contract the bank may propose.
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4 Data and descriptive statistics
For the purposes of this study, we built an original database from data made public by the EBRD
over time. Our database includes 1788 financial contracts signed by the bank with private and public
clients from 1991 to 2003. It contains information in each case on the identity and nationality of the
clients, the amount of the contract in ECU/Euros, the value of the investment project, the sector of
investment, the year the contract was signed, the type of contract (loan, share, equity or guarantee),
and other characteristics (old clients, private/public, macro-programs...). In this section we present a
brief overview of the content of our database and discuss the most relevant descriptive statistics.
4.1 The contracts
The number of contracts and the amount of annual investments were very low at the beginning of the
transition process (see Figures 2 and 3). The EBRD was underusing its capital, and this was a source
of criticism among the shareholders and commentators. This underuse was principally due to the severe
macroeconomic downturn that affected the entire region. After these initial difficulties,the bank’s aim
was to strongly increase the volume of the portfolio. The recovery of most of the countries in the region
helped the EBRD to sign more contracts and to make sizeable profits from 1999 onwards.
The average EBRD investment was remarkably stable with a slight downward trend in the most
recent years (see Figure 4). According to the information available on the EBRD website, the bank
designed different kinds of contract. They all represent the financial instruments by which the bank
participates in the realization of the investment project proposed by the borrower. These contracts
differ not only in the maturity of the credits but also in other characteristics, which we will discuss
below. First, in Table 1, we provide a general overview of the different kinds of contract signed by the
bank and the frequency of the contracts:
[Table 1 about here]
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Three main categories of credit instrument can be distinguished: loan, guarantee, and share and
equity contracts. Loans were the financial contract most frequently used by the EBRD between 1991 and
2003 (Figure 5). A loan is generally considered as a short-term contract, lasting five years on average,
and tailored to meet the particular requirements of the project. The credit risk is usually taken by the
bank or partially syndicated to the market. A loan may be securitized by a borrower’s asset and/or
converted into shares or may be equity-linked. The second important category of contract includes
share and equity. Share-type contracts were mainly signed at the beginning of the EBRD’s activity,
while equity contracts represent a broader category of financial contracts including share contracts.
An equity investment can be undertaken in various forms, including subscription to ordinary shares.
When the EBRD takes an equity stake, it expects an appropriate return on its investment. The bank
usually sells its equity investment on a non-recourse basis, has a clear exit strategy and only takes a
minority position.4 The third category of credit instruments refers to guarantee contracts. They were
used mainly at the end of our dataset period. Through this type of contract, the bank helps borrowers
with gaining access to financial sources through the provision of guarantees (EBRD, 1999).
4Equity is considered to be a non-contingent contract.
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Figure 5: Financial contracts by type in percentage by year
Table 2 and 3 show descriptive statistics on the total values of projects that were selected by the
EBRD and the share that it effectively financed. In most accepted projects, the EBRD is not the
only lending source.5 Statistical information is given for the total population and for two periods, one
at the outset of transition (1993-1995) and the other at the end of the sample period (2000-2003).
The total project value of loans is always higher than that of shares, but both decreased over time.
The median bank lending in loan contracts remained unchanged over time, while it declined in share
contracts. Figure 6 compares the fraction of the total project value financed by the EBRD for share
and loan contracts. This fraction increases proportionally with the total project value but the increase
is more pronounced for shares than for loans. As a shareholder, the bank can control the management
of the firm, and this implies a reduction in uncertainty associated with imperfect information about the
firm’s behavior. The bank tends to augment its participation with the size of the project value in share
contracts in order to protect itself against the risk. As for loans, the collateral allows for a control of
risk.
5The contracts issued by the EBRD always require a co-financed part. This may be through cash financing from the
firm or, in other cases, from a consortium of commercial banks. However, the involvement of commercial banks in the
credit process is strictly subject to EBRD participation. Hence, even in this case, the EBRD plays the role of dominant
agent.
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[Table 2 about here]
[Table 3 about here]
We also split the population into two subgroups of firms:6 a first group consisting of firms that
had obtained one credit over the sample period (around 1270 firms) and a second group consisting of
firms that had signed more than one contract (around 100 firms). Tables 4 and 5 show data for single-
contract and several-contract firms respectively. The median bank lending fraction for several-contract
firms is always more important than for single-contract firms. These differences may be associated with
reputation premia.
[Table 4 about here]
[Table 5 about here]
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Figure 6: Fraction of EBRD financing in share and loan contracts (red points and dashed line for shares,
and blue points and solid line stand for loans)
In order to learn more about the attitude of the EBRD toward risk, we consider the likelihood of a
contract type granted by the bank that is chosen against other possible ones conditional on the total
6This split in the population will be essential to test the role of memory on bank behavior in the econometric exercise.
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investment size and the amount of credit supplied by the bank. In this way, we expect some information
on the bank’s risk behavior when it finances large projects. To do so, we run a multilogit estimation
by regressing the 13 contract types against all available information: the investment size, the size of
credit, the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and democracy indexes and the country of origin’s
GDP per capita level. Then, we compute the probabilities for the two most frequently types of signed
contract (loans and equity/share) in both subsamples (single-contract subsample and more-than-one-
contract subsample). The results are graphically represented in Figures 7 and 8. The probability of
signing one contract type (either loan or equity/share) conditional on the investment size is shown in
a graph on the left of each figure, and the probability of signing one contract type conditional on the
credit size is represented on the right. Let us define wi as the vector of the characteristics associated
with the client (i) that can influence the EBRD’s decision to grant her one type of contract (Y = j)
rather than another. The model of the EBRD’s contract choice can be defined by:
Pr ob(Yi = j | wi) =
exp(w0iαj)P13
j=1 exp(w
0
iαj)
, j = 1...13.
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Figure 7: Multilogit probabilities for the subsample of unique contracts
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The multilogit predictions show that there is a higher probability of the bank granting a loan rather
than a share or equity contract in respect of any size of investment or credit. However, there is a
clear difference in the distribution between the two subsamples. In the single-contract subsample, the
probability of granting a loan increases with the size of investment or credit, while in the more-than-one-
contract subsample, the probabilities follow a random walk instead. This difference in the distribution
of probabilities may signal that the EBRD does not behave in the same way for a first contract as for a
second (or further) contract. The bank certainly has less client information for a first contract than for
a second and, hence, the first contract carries more risk. The bank seems to adjust its lending policy in
the face of this higher risk. These results suggest the hypothesis that the EBRD’s lending policy does
not consist of offering a formatted menu but rather of granting credits tailored on the basis of client
information and possibly on the basis of whether it is for a first or further contract.
4.2 Countries and sectors
There are two criteria that can account for the geographical distribution of contracts between 1991
and 2003: market size (population size or income per-capita), and political regime. Figures 9 and 10
show the geographical distribution of EBRD investments in cumulated terms by country and per-capita
16
by country. Russia received more credits than any other country in the region during the period,
followed by the Eastern European countries, and then by the Central Asian countries. The Central
Asian countries have not only a poor business climate but also non-democratic institutions. In terms of
the cumulated amount of investment per capita, the ranking among the host countries is substantially
reversed in the upper half of the distribution. The Central European countries, which are the most
developed countries of the population and which led the transition process, received the largest per
capita financing (around 300000 euros for Slovenia, Croatia and Estonia), while the Central Asian
countries still lag behind significantly. According to this second criterion, Russia moves down to the
lower half of the distribution.
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Figure 9: Cumulated EBRD investment by country (€ million)
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Figure 10: Cumulated EBRD investments per capita by country (€ thousands)
[Table 6 about here]
We split the distribution into three sub-periods (1991-1995, 1996-1999 and 2000-2003). Table 6
shows that at the beginning of the transition process, almost half of the investments went to the early
starters, Central Europe and the Baltic states. Their share later reduced to roughly one-third of the
total. During the transition process, Russia received an increasing proportion of EBRD investment
and its share remained stable. South-Eastern Europe saw a progressive increase in its share of EBRD
investment during the period. The relative share of Eastern Europe and the Caucasus decreased. Finally,
the Central Asian countries reached a noticeable share between 1996 and 1999 which fell by half in the
final period.
[Table 7 about here]
As for the distribution by sector (Table 7) 7 at the beginning of the transition, most of EBRD
investment went to Finance, Telecom, Oil/Gas/Natural Resources and Other sectors. The objective was
7A complete list of all the sectors is included in Appendix A.
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to finance infrastructure and the restructuring of the banking and the manufacturing sectors. Thereafter,
the focus of the bank switched to the financing of the creation of small and medium enterprises (SMEs).
5 Empirical strategy
The EBRD selects one of the thirteen different available contracts (Table 1) when deciding to finance the
investment project of a firm. The one selected should be the contract that reduces as much as possible
the asymmetric information between the principal and the agent. The objective of the econometric
analysis is to identify the screening device that enables the bank to discriminate between the firms and
to select the contract that will incite them to behave well. In particular, we want to verify whether
the bank modifies its behavior when it signs several contracts with the same firm over time. If it does,
as proved by Lambert (1983), Rogerson (1985) and Chiappori et al. (1994), this means that the bank
uses the historical information (memory) about the firm to adjust the financing conditions in order
to maximize its profits. In order to test this, after considering the full sample, we proceed first by
splitting the whole population into two subpopulations: one-contract firms and several-contract firms.
Historical information is available on the firms in the subpopulation of several-contract firms, and we
want to check whether the bank uses this information. In this way, we can both control for imperfect
information and identify the role of memory (reputation). We apply the same econometric specification
to both subpopulations but allow for different specifications of the same fixed effects.
According to the level of significance of the fixed effects, we are able to check (i) the degree of
heterogeneity that they account for and (ii) the importance of the reputation effect captured by an
ad-hoc fixed effect in the case of established clients.
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5.1 Econometric specification
In order to run our econometric exercise, we match data referring to a few characteristics of the contracts
signed by the bank with other data referring to the environment in which the investment project has been
run. In this way, we can capture the degree of the investment risk (country and credit risks). According
to the general theoretical framework discussed in Section 2, the amount of the credit contract is supposed
to be the result of a combination of the market conditions and the expected return of the investment.
The variables referring to the environment are: the measure of income level in the host market
(GDP per capita), an indicator for political institutions (degree of democracy, DEM), time dummies
and, finally, a dummy for public clients. In fact, a public client is more likely to be considered as a
solvent client. Concerning the contract, in addition to the value of the credit (IV) granted by the EBRD
to the firm, we consider the type of contract, the year it was signed and the return of the investment
of that firm that can be approximated, for a solvent firm, by the value of its productive investment
(IP, available in the database). This investment value is the minimum level of return of any successful
productive investment by the firm, which corresponds to its capacity for repayment.
The maturity of a credit is different for each category of contract and the type of contract is an
approximate indicator of the credit maturity, as mentioned in Subsection 4.1. Finally, we know that
the interest rate charged by the EBRD is equal to the LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) plus
a risk premium. The value of the LIBOR allows us to capture the current conditions of the financial
markets. From the firm’s point of view, the LIBOR is an approximated measure of the effort required
to establish its reputation as being solvent. Fom the bank’s point of view, any changes in the LIBOR
will affect the credit supply to the firm. In addition, for the specific case of loan contracts, the LIBOR
can approximate the rate of return of the bank’s investment.
As for the risk premium, the data from the EBRD are not available. However, this does not
represent an obstacle for the issue we are studying. As argued in Section 2, the borrowing cost cannot
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be an unambiguous indicator of the type of borrowers. In our exercise, we overcome this problem by
introducing individual fixed effects, which control for the omitted variable bias. A description of the
variables is given in Box 1.
[Box 1 about here]
We formulate the empirical model as follows. Let us define the dependent variable (value of the
credit) as Y (IV ) and X =(IP, Public,DEM,Libor,GDP ) as the vector of the independent variables.
Each entry of the dependent variable, the size of the credit for financing an investment project (IP ), is
defined as yitjs, with i = firm, t = year, j = host country, s =sector. We also include an interaction
term (Demjt ∗yeart) between the democracy index and the time dummies. This term is meant to track
the possible changes of the variable democracy over time in each country. Therefore, the equation we
consider can be defined as:
IVitjs = α0 + β1IPitjs + β2Publici + β3Demjt + β4Libort + β5GDPjt + (1)
β6(Demjt ∗ yeart) + εitjs.
Our database is not a true panel, but rather a pooling of independent cross sections over time.
Hence, we need to control for heterogeneity problems As argued in Wooldridge (2006), this pooled
structure implies that the dependent variable may have different distributions in different time periods
and, to control for this, we need to introduce some time-fixed effects (µt). The same reasoning applies
to the sector dimension, for which we include some sector-fixed effects (µs). In addition, as shown, for
instance, in Baltagi (2008), we also need to include the unobservable time-invariant individual-specific
effect (µi) to control for the heterogeneity problem as much as possible. Controlling for all these effects
allows to decompose the error term (εitjs) in the following way:
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εitjs = µi + µt + µs + νitjs , (2)
where µi is the unobservable time-invariant individual-specific effect and νitjs denotes the remaining
disturbances, which are now expected to be IID(0, σ2ν). By inserting the error decomposition into the
previous equation, we obtain the following equation:
IVitjs = α0 + β1IPitjs + β2Publici + β3Demjt + β4Libort + β5GDPjt + (3)
β6(Demjt ∗ yeart) + γ1µi + γ2µt + γ3µs + νitjs .
The choice of the variable µi turns out to be crucial for obtaining independence between the residuals
and the dependent variable. In a standard panel effect, the variable µi would be simply identified with
firm-fixed effects. Due to the structure of the panel, this option is not possible here. It is therefore
necessary to look for other potential candidates, which do not introduce endogeneity distortions. We
start by considering the sectors of activity of the investing firms (Sector).The theoretical framework
indicates the contract type as one of the possible ways to identify the individual-firm effects. The
contract type is in fact time-invariant according to the EBRD statements. In our exercises, the firm-
fixed effects (FE) will be alternatively identified by the following exogenous variables: the contract type
granted at time t (C13), and, for established clients obtaining more than one contract, the contract
type signed by a firm at t = 1(C13FIRST ) or the value of the investment of the same firm financed at
t = 1 (IPFIRST ). Therefore, the specification used for the estimation can be written as:
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IVitjs = α0 + β1IPitjs + β2DIj + β3Demjt + β4(Libort) + β5GDPjt (4)
+β6(Demjt ∗ yeart) + γ1FEi + γ2Y eart + γ3Sectors + νitjs
[Table 8 about here]
Table 8 gives descriptive statistics for some of these variables for the overall period and for two specific
years: 1993 and 2003. The dependent variable is the financing amount (IV ) granted by the EBRD. This
is one of the variables in the bank’s profit function, which depends negatively on the riskiness of the
project.8 It reflects both the screening process and the incentive mechanism that take place between
clients. The measure of political institutions is taken from the Polity IV project (2007). This is an
index varying between zero (for an absolute autocracy) and ten (for a fully-fledged democracy).9 In
our population this index declines over time because the EBRD financed democracies of Central and
Eastern Europe at the beginning of the transition and later started to finance autocratic countries from
Central Asia. The variation of the LIBOR corresponds to the historical values of the credit market
during the period.
According to the theoretical results discussed in Section 2, we expect that all independent variables
in equation (4), except the LIBOR, will have a positive sign. An increase in the LIBOR implies a
decrease in the amount of credit. In order to test the level of individual heterogeneity, we apply the
technique of pooled OLS versus fixed effects.10 In all the contracts signed by the EBRD, the type of
contract is an individual time invariant characteristic. We will treat it as an individual fixed effect. We
will identify it by applying the three different measures: C13, C13FIRST , IPFIRST. By running a
regression with C13 as an individual fixed effect, we do not include any historical information for the
8See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) on credit rationing.
9See the Polity IV website for details on how the scores are computed: www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.
10The econometric estimations were computed with the Stata 9.0 package.
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firms. When we introduce historical information on individual firms (using the FIRST variable), it is
possible to observe whether the past performance of firms affects the conditions of the contract proposed
by the bank. If it does, we can conclude that the bank memorizes the past information and uses it to
adjust the conditions of the future contracts for each individual firm.
5.2 Results
Our database contains all contracts signed by the bank during the period 1991-2003. First, we concen-
trate on the full sample and, then, we split it into two groups: one-contract firms and several-contract
firms. In order to test the reputation effect, we run regressions separately for each group of firms. We
proceed first by assessing whether the fixed effect model should be preferred to the pooled OLS (with
the F-test) and to the random effect model (with the Hausman test). In all the regressions we control
for heteroskedasticity by applying either the White or the cluster correction. Then, we test the different
measures of individual fixed effects.
5.2.1 The full sample
We first consider all contracts as though they are totally independent. Then, we identify the main
factors that can influence the size of the credits granted by the EBRD. In Table 9a, we show the output
of the OLS estimations for the pool of observations when considering dummies by year, by sector and
an interaction term (dem*years), which takes into account the transition of the political regime in the
host countries towards democracy. In order to control for heteroskedasticity problems, we correct the
residuals with either the White or the cluster method. The cluster method is appropriate since it allows
us to take into consideration the fact that one firm can apply for more than one contract.
The results we obtain are robust overall. The proxy of the repayment capacity (IP) and the
GDP per capita of the host country have a positive impact on the size of credit. Being a public borrower
also has a positive impact on the size of credit, which can be interpreted as a guarantee for being a
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solvent client. In contrast, the LIBOR and the democracy index display negative signs. As for the
LIBOR, the result simply confirms that the size of the credit is inversely related to the interest rate level.
The negative sign associated with the democracy index indicates that the EBRD invests increasingly
over time in the less democratic countries (see Subsection 4.2). This can be explained by the fact that at
the beginning of the transition the EBRD granted few credits but mostly in more democratic countries
then increased its supply of credits to all types of regimes, and, finally, kept investing a great deal in less
democratic countries because the more democratic ones started to be financed by the private investment
banks. Finally, the statistical tests run for the time and sector dummies state that those variables are
not always statistically significant. Thus, time, sector or transition dynamics are not discriminating
factors influencing the size of credit granted by the bank.
We repeat the same exercise by including a type of fixed effect at firm level: the type of contract.
As we discuss comprehensively in the first part of the study, most of the contracts offered by the bank
are standardized. Therefore, it is likely that the type of the contract signed by the client is somewhat the
result of the bank’s screening process, and it is automatically defined by the contractual condition a firm
is required to fulfill. The estimations run by using these fixed effects (Table 10a) confirm the previous
results. The regressors (when statistically significant) improve their degree of significance. According
to the F-test, the fixed effect estimation has to be preferred to the pooled OLS when including the
interaction term. Again, the size of the investment, the identity of the client and the level of the GDP
per capita in the host market have a positive impact on the size of credit. Finally, we establish that
the fixed effects cover almost three-quarters of the variance. This result suggests that there really is
a device to discriminate between clients and helps to explain the differences in the amount of credit
granted by the bank.
In addition, we perform a robustness check. Another characteristic that may be very important for
the bank’s lending decisions is the fraction of the borrower’s capital owned by an international firm. An
international firm is defined as one from the United States, Canada, Western Europe, Japan or other
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Asian developed country or city-state, Australia or New Zealand. As a shareholder, the international
firm is assumed to have some control over the management of the local firm, and to bring management
experience, international contacts, access to capital markets and international clients, and expectations
of high returns. These international firms are usually considered as well established clients and may
contribute to reducing the investment project’s risk evaluation by the EBRD when they own a fraction
of the local borrower’s capital. We wanted to check whether this international factor affects the bank’s
behavior. To do so, we built an ad-hoc dummy (dummy MNE) distinguishing the 617 projects with at
least one international partner from those with none. We add this variable to the regressors and we run
again the previous estimations whose results are shown in Tables 9b and 10b. The specification performs
well but the new dummy is never statistically significant.11 The presence of an international partner
does not seem to play any role in the bank’s lending behavior towards the borrowers that obtained a
credit.12
Having considered the full sample, we now want to go further by splitting the sample into two
subsamples in order to verify the results’ robustness. The first subsample includes all firms having
signed only one contract while the second one is composed of the firms that had signed more than one
contract. The specific split of the sample is the method we propose to use to identify the role of memory
in the bank’s lending decisions.
[Table 9a and 9b about here]
[Table 10a and 10b about here]
5.2.2 One-contract firms
This subpopulation includes 1269 contracts. Since, each contract corresponds to a particular firm, we
do not have historical information on the firms. Therefore we can only test one measure of individual
11We ran other regressions to check for robustness using the one-contract subsample. Results are available upon request.
12The presence of an international partner could possibly affect the bank’s decision to grant or not a credit to an applicant
but the EBRD does not provide information on rejected projects in order for us to be able to test this.
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fixed effects (C13). This is a qualitative variable that identifies each type of the thirteen contracts.
[Table 11 about here]
[Table 12 about here]
The results of the F-test and the Hausman test show that the fixed effect model should be preferred
to the pooled and random effects models (Tables 11 and 12). In addition, the fraction of the variance
due to fixed effects (ρ) is particularly high (0.70). The estimate of ρ suggests that almost three-quarters
of the variation in the amount of financing is related to the different types of contract (Baltagi, 2008 and
Baum, 2006). In the fixed effect estimations, the coefficients of all the explanatory variables (when they
are statistically significant) display the expected sign. The firm’s repayment capacity is always highly
significant. All dummy variables are always statistically significant. The public identity of a client turns
out to be important because a public client may be considered by the bank as less risky than a private
one. The significance of the interaction term between democracy (DEM) and the time dummy means
that the more democratic a country is over time, the larger the size of the financing offered by the bank.
This result either tends to confirm the official claim that the EBRD promotes democratic institutions
in transition countries or means that a country moving to democracy (over time) offers more profitable
investment opportunities.
For an additional robustness check of the obtained results, we also ran regressions using the same
specification for a particular sector, banking and finance, in which the EBRD had been very active in
all transition countries over the sample period. The results obtained are very similar to those of the full
sample (Table 13).
[Table 13 about here]
To sum up, for the one-contract firms the individual fixed effects by type of contract turn out to be
a good measure for identifying individual heterogeneity. Each contract signed by the bank is granted
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according to the individual characteristics of the client. This captures the optimal behavior of the bank
in the face of both adverse selection and moral hazard when it signs a first contract with a firm that it
has selected.
5.2.3 Several-contract firms
This subpopulation includes 346 contracts and includes all firms that obtained more than one contract.
Therefore, we have historical information on each individual firm and we can control for it. Given
this characteristic, we would like to check whether the individual heterogeneity we identified in the
previous subpopulation holds in the present one. If it does, this means that the bank deals with firms of
both subsamples in the same way, hence ignoring historical information in the subpopulation of several-
contract firms. Thus, we repeat the previous exercise in its entirety for this subsample. In order to
control for heteroskedasticity, we alternatively apply the White and the cluster corrections. The cluster
correction is important for controlling the autocorrelation in the residuals because each firm appears
more than once in the subsample.
[Table 14 about here]
[Table 15 about here]
The previous exercise for this subsample yields a first important result: fixed effects by type of
contract do not capture the individual heterogeneity, as happened previously (Tables 14 and 15). First,
the F-test is weakly significant or insignificant, while the Hausman test strongly rejects the random
effect model. As a result, we conclude that the model with contract-type (C13) fixed effects is not
a quite robust estimation technique for this subpopulation, even though these estimations should be
preferred to the pooled and random effects estimations. This conclusion is reinforced by the low level
of ρ(0.07—0.12) of these estimations.
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We, therefore, need to look for other measures of fixed effects for controlling individual heterogeneity.
One reasonable factor that can have an important impact on discrimination between clients is the client’s
reputation. As discussed by Boot and Thakor (1994), an established client may enjoy better conditions
when signing various contracts with the same bank. We are able to identify the potential reputation of a
client by isolating the first type of contract and the value of the first investment (namely, the repayment
capacity) for the firm that appears more than once in our database. Then, we match these values to
the other (later) contracts signed by the same firm. In order to avoid endogeneity problems, we extract
from this sub-sample of several-contract firms the entries that correspond to the first contract for all
firms as well as the firms with more than one contract signed the same year (as first entry). We are not
able to determine the chronological order of these contracts.
In this way, we are able to use the historical information included in this subsample by testing
two measures of individual fixed effects defined previously: C13FIRST and IPFIRST. Each of these
measures contains this historical information because it takes into account the information associated
with the first contract signed by each firm (FIRST). The variable IPFIRST represents the project value
of the first contract; the variable C13FIRST is the type of the first signed contract. The present exercise
yields the second important result of the paper: the fixed effects associated with the project value of
the first contract are a good measure to account for individual heterogeneity in this subsample.
[Table 16 about here]
[Table 17 about here]
[Table 18 about here]
Whenever the project value of the first contract (IPFIRST ) is included in the individual fixed effects,
the value of ρ increases strongly [Tables 17 and 18]. When we only consider the type of contract (C13 ),
the level of ρ is low (first column in Table 14). Then, when we consider a measure of reputation for
established clients (second and third column in Table 14), the value of ρ is high, above all when we
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consider the size of the first investment (IPFIRST ). This result is evidence of the presence of memory.
The project value of the first contract is historical information for the bank since it reflects what the
firm paid back, while the type of the first contract contains no history. In addition, the project value
(IP) is always statistically significant and has the expected sign. Concerning the other variables, they
lose part of their statistical significance when compared with the previous exercise but keep the expected
sign. The only difference is for the identity (PUBLIC ) of the client. Being a public partner no longer
has strategic importance. It even displays a negative sign in one estimation out of four. In the previous
sample, the absence of historical information obliged the bank to rely on the other available variables, for
instance, public ownership. Once the bank is dealing with established clients, the previous public-status
effect is replaced by a more specific client-reputation effect. Another way to interpret this result (and,
especially, the negative sign of the coefficient) is simply to argue that the bank changed its strategy
of operating in the market. It may be more oriented toward financing projects not involving public
partners.
Once more, for a robustness check, in the regressions carried out for the banking and finance sector
alone, the results for the more-than-one-contract subsample are similar to those of all sectors involved.
The memory effect applies especially for native banks, i.e. local borrowing banks that do not have an
international partner (Tables 19 and 20).
[Table 19 about here]
[Table 20 about here]
To conclude, the memory of the first contract overrides all the other potential effects. It turns out
that the coefficient is always statistically significant. Memory thus allows the bank to discriminate
between firms according to their individual historical characteristics and to offer tailored contracts in
order to control risk better. As an indicator, it can be observed that the number of groups inside this
subsample increases from eight to between ninety and ninety-four as a result of the memory effect.
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6 Conclusions
Contract theory has proved that the optimal contract generally exhibits memory in repeated contracts
with moral hazard. It has turned out to be difficult to identify this clearly in the empirical literature
on long-term contracting in financial intermediation. Considering that the method used so far in this
literature is flawed, we have proposed in this paper an alternative empirical method based on the
separation of observations between firms having signed one contract and firms having signed more
than one contract. We argue that this procedure is required to control for the effect of asymmetric
information in the bank’s lending policy. Nevertheless, this is not sufficient. The effect of memory on
moral hazard can be influenced by the competition effect in the banking industry, making it hard to
isolate. The dataset we built from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development allows us
to achieve this. The EBRD was in a situation of monopoly in many transition countries, especially at
the outset of the transition process. Moreover, the EBRD’s shareholders are sovereign and assigned to
the bank its mission to foster and not to crowd out financial flows towards the private sector in these
countries. Our results yield two conclusions. First, they unambiguously identify the role of memory in
the bank’s lending decisions when the firms have signed more than one contract. Second, they confirm
the relevance of the empirical method we propose to control for the adverse selection effect, which,
in our opinion, explains the inconclusive results that is generally observed in the empirical literature.
The common background of our empirical tests has been the identification of the mechanisms adopted
by the bank to discriminate between clients and to offer them profitable contracts suitable for their
type. According to our results, the EBRD’s lending policy was a combination of its specific objectives
in the former Soviet bloc and the constraints associated with the information on clients. The need to
cope with high credit risk unambiguously forced the bank to adopt measures of protection by using a
client-screening scheme. As discussed in the economic literature, there is no unique scheme available
to be implemented. In our sample, a screening device as general as the type of contract turned out to
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be an efficient tool, especially when considering sectoral subsamples of data. The importance of the
cluster correction in the absence of memory effects may indicate that the EBRD probably designed
various types of contract, each one tailored to the market conditions of a specific sector. Then, the
bank offered these to clients who wanted to invest in a particular sector and country. Therefore, the
sectoral characteristics become the device rendering the contract itself the most suitable screening tool.
Our econometric specification led to robust results, but we think that these would be hard to replicate
with data on private banks, whose lending policies are affected by competition.
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LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: EBRD contracts and their frequency (1991-2003)
(Source: EBRD, Calculus: authors)
Contract Freq. %
Debt 1 0.06
Equity 141 7.92
Guarantee 100 5.62
Line of Credit 7 0.39
Loan 949 53.31
Loan/Line of credit 1 0.06
Loan/Shares 96 5.39
Loan/Guarantee 1 0.06
Senior debt 72 4.04
Shares 404 22.70
Shares/Loan 2 0.11
Shares/Loan/Share 1 0.06
Share/Loan/Guarantee 1 0.06
Subordinated debt 4 0.22
TOTAL 1780 100
Table 2: Descriptive statistics on loans (value € mill. )
(Source: EBRD, Calculus: authors)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Median Min Max
Total sample1
Bank financing 945 21.25 27.76 12.7 0.1 233.76
Tot. project value 936 60.81 109.94 29.25 0.1 923.9
Up to 1995
Bank financing 219 19.98 23.53 10.90 0.2 142
Tot. project value 220 68.24 115.81 31.85 0.5 923.9
From 2000 onwards
Bank financing 438 21.19 31.36 10.00 0.1 233.76
Tot. project value 427 50.60 94.94 15.00 0.1 750
1The difference between the number of observation in bank financing and total project value is due to lack of data for one of the two
variables.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics on shares (value € mill.)
(Source: EBRD, Calculus: authors)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Median Min Max
Total sample
Bank financing 402 9.05 13.93 3.2 0.1 125
Tot. project value 402 34.57 76.98 8.2 0.1 1028.9
Up to 1995
Bank financing 84 10.14 11.82 5.9 0.1 53.4
Tot. project value 84 35.92 59.96 18.6 0.7 384.1
From 2000 onwards
Bank financing 100 7.45 11.95 3.1 0.3 53.7
Tot. project value 99 26.87 63.57 4.8 0.5 365.8
Table 4: Descriptive statistics on single contracts (value € mill.)
(Source: EBRD, Calculus: authors)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Median Min Max
Total sample
Bank financing 1369 17.73 25.53 8.8 0.1 233.8
Value project 1353 55.02 106.34 17.1 0.1 1028.9
Up to 1995
Bank financing 279 17.86 22.18 9.1 0.1 142
Value project 279 68.95 122.65 27.5 0.5 924.8
From 2000 onwards
Bank financing 596 18.08 29.05 7.9 0.1 233.8
Value project 596 44.8 87.60 10.09 0.1 750
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics on several-contract firms (value € mill. )
(Source: EBRD, Calculus: authors)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Median Min Max
Total sample
Bank financing 405 11.97 17.75 6.6 0.5 130
Tot. project value 395 28.7 56.3 8.7 0.5 651.3
Up to 1995
Bank financing 59 16.47 20.83 8.8 0.5 109.8
Tot. project value 59 36.25 53.61 20.8 1.3 329.6
From 2000 onwards
Bank financing 219 11.78 18.87 5.6 0.1 130
Tot. project value 202 28.63 65.32 7.9 0.1 651.3
Table 6: Descriptive statistics: Cumulated investment by region (% )
(Source: EBRD, Calculus: authors)
Regions 1991-1995 1996-1999 2000-2003
Russia 19.9 29.1 28.8
Central Europe and Baltic States 45.9 32.9 36.0
Eastern Europe and the Caucasus 11.8 11.9 7.5
South-Eastern Europe 16.8 13.5 20.5
Central Asia 5.6 12.6 7.2
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Table 7: Descriptive statistics: Cumulated investment by sector (% )
(Source: EBRD, Calculus: authors)
Sector 1991-1995 1996-1999 2000-2003
Finance 19.6 27.0 30.2
Environment .. 4.1 ..
Food 2.6 8.1 9.0
Telecom 14.5 6.8 4.9
Energy 9.5 9.7 8.9
Oil/Gas/Nat.Res. 10.8 10.3 8.4
Transport 8.8 3.4 16.1
Others 34.3 30.6 22.4
BOX 1: LIST OF VARIABLES
C13 Type of contract signed by the EBRD (13 possible contracts)
DEM Index of democratic level in the country hosting the investment (Polity IV, 2007)
PUBLIC Dummy variable for presence of a public client or other interests of the bank in the project
DSY Dummy for investments financed by the EBRD for the same firm in the same year
GDP Gross domestic product per-capita of the host country (IMF statistics, 2007)
IP Total value of the investment project
IPDSY Value of projects for firms obtaining more than one credit in the same year
IV Value of the investment financed by the EBRD
Libor Average annual value of LIBOR interest rate at 12 months.
FIRST Dummy for the first contract signed by the EBRD with firms obtaining more than one credit
Sector Dummy by sector
Year Time dummy
C13FIRST Interaction term between C13 and FIRST
C13IPFIRST Interaction term among C13, IP and FIRST
IPFIRST Interaction term between IP and FIRST
Dummy MNE Dummy for contract involving a multinational firm as a partner
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Table 8: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Sample
Libor 1788 4.23 1.45 2.17 9.91
GDP per-capita ($) 1706 2706.5 2143.6 151.48 13937.4
Polity IV index (DEM) 1662 6.5 2.85 0 10
EBRD Credit Value (€ mill. ) 1766 16.5 24.2 0 233.7
Total project value (€ mill. ) 1750 49.23 97.87 0 1028.9
Financing share 1728 0.6 0.33 0.009 1
1993
Libor 71 7.24 0 7.24 7.24
GDP per-capita ($) 68 2167 1519.7 225.8 6801.8
Polity IV index (DEM) 68 7.32 2.45 0 10
EBRD Credit Value (€ mill.) 71 20.36 23.9 0.1 100.12
Total project value (€ mill.) 71 69.98 96.95 1.3 464.7
Financing share 71 0.43 0.28 0.04 1
2003
Libor 272 2.17 0 2.17 2.17
GDP per-capita ($) 260 3292.8 2539.6 248.2 13937.4
Polity IV index (DEM) 254 6.61 3.04 0 10
EBRD Credit Value (€ mill.) 270 13.69 23.7 0.1 230.2
Total project value(€ mill.) 271 33.26 77.4 0.1 750
Financing share 270 0.69 0.34 0.01 1
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Table 9a: Econometric results: Full sample
Method of estimation: Pooled OLS, Value in brackets: Std Error,
Dependent variable: IV
OLS OLS OLS OLS
C 13.17 (5.77)** 7.68(5.89) 13.61(5.11)** 8.08(2.26)**
IP 0.16 (0.019)*** 0.16(0.02)*** 0.16 (0.008)*** 0.16(0.008)***
PUBLIC 7.55(2.34)*** 7.40(2.37)*** 7.55(2.04)*** 7.48(1.90)***
Dem -0.25(0.14)* -1.65(0.79)** -0.25(0.02)*** -0.14(0.18)
Libor -1.72 (0.69)** 0.26(0.82) -1.72 (0.16)*** -1.67(0.25)***
GDP 0.0006(0.0002)** 0.0005(0.0003)** 0.0006(0.0002)*** 0.0005(0.0002)**
Dummy years yes yes yes yes
Dummy sectors yes yes yes yes
DEM*years no yes no yes
Tests:
D. Years=0 2.93*** 0.50 26647*** 234.71***
D. Sectors=0 4.97*** 4.14*** 1.4 105*** 1.4 105***
DEM*year=0 1.22* 1747.38***
DEM*year=D. Years 1.14 1499.96***
Robustness errors Heterosk. Heterosk Clusters Clusters
Adj. R-Square 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.52
OBS 1620 1620 1614 1614
*** 1% significance level; ** 5%; * 10%
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Table 9b: Econometric results: Full sample
Method of estimation: Pooled OLS, Value in brackets: Std Error,
Dependent variable: IV
OLS OLS OLS OLS
C 10.83 (2.81)*** 5.04(3.16) 10.90(2.74)*** 5.13(1.28)***
IP 0.16 (0.019)*** 0.16(0.02)*** 0.16 (0.008)*** 0.16(0.008)***
PUBLIC 7.22(2.36)*** 6.90(2.40)*** 7.24(2.36)*** 6.91(2.32)**
Dem -0.24(0.14)* -1.71(0.77)** -0.23(0.03)*** -1.71(0.29)***
Libor -1.76 (0.67)** 0.36(0.82) -1.72 (0.14)*** 0.35(0.67)
GDP 0.0006(0.0002)** 0.0005(0.0003)** 0.0006(0.0002)*** 0.0005(0.0002)**
Dummy MNE -0.83 (0.90) -1.2 (0.91) -0.79 (0.88) -1.16 (1.16)
Dummy years yes yes yes yes
Dummy sectors yes yes yes yes
DEM*years no yes no yes
Tests:
D. Years=0 3.01*** 0.49 1.5 105*** 260.86***
D. Sectors=0 5.02*** 4.23*** 40210*** 3.4 105***
DEM*year=0 1.39 1747.38***
DEM*year=D. Years 1.26 1.1 105***
Robustness errors Heterosk. Heterosk Clusters Clusters
Adj. R-Square 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.52
OBS 1620 1620 1614 1614
*** 1% significance level; ** 5%; * 10%
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Table 10a
Econometric results: full sample
Method of estimation: Fixed effects, Value in brackets: Std Error,
Dependent variable: IV
Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects
C 12.7 (6.10)** 5.15 (6.37) 12.72 (3.82)*** 5.15 (2.19)**
IP 0.16 (0.005)*** 0.16(0.005)*** 0.16 (0.007)*** 0.16(0.007)***
PUBLIC 6.88 (1.76)*** 6.81 (1.77)*** 6.88 (1.49)*** 6.81 (1.38)***
Dem -0.18 (0.17) -0.79 (1.02) -0.18 (0.06)*** -0.79 (0.48)
Libor -1.92(0.70) 0.77 (1.13) -1.92(0.21)*** 0.77 (0.46)
GDP 0.0006(0.0002) 0.0005 (0.0002)** 0.0006(0.0002***) 0.0005 (0.0002)**
Dummy years yes yes yes yes
Dummy sectors yes yes yes yes
DEM*years no yes no yes
Fixed effects C13 C13 C13 C13
Tests:
Hausman Test (χ2) 39.64 17.18***
F-test: fixed vs pooled 4.52*** 4.65***
D. Years=0 3.84*** 3.84*** 1.8 106*** 1.4 105***
D. Sectors=0 2.87*** 2.87*** 2.1 105*** 1582***
DEM*year=0 0.28 1.4 105***
σu 27.55 28.05 27.55 28.05
ρ 0.72 0.73 0.72 0.73
Robustness errors Heterosk. Heterosk Clusters Clusters
R-Square (within) 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.50
OBS 1614 1265 1614 1614
Groups 13 13 13 13
*** 1% significance level; ** 5%; * 10%
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Table 10b
Econometric results: full sample
Method of estimation: Fixed effects, Value in brackets: Std Error,
Dependent variable: IV
Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects
C 10.49 (4.59)** 2.94 (4.84) 10.49 (1.62)*** 2.94 (1.83)
IP 0.16 (0.005)*** 0.16(0.005)*** 0.16 (0.007)*** 0.16(0.007)***
PUBLIC 6.72 (1.81)*** 6.46 (1.82)*** 6.72 (1.87)*** 6.46 (1.88)***
Dem -0.17 (0.17) -0.82 (1.02) -0.18 (0.04)*** -0.82 (0.51)
Libor -1.94(1.57) 0.83 (1.13) -1.94(0.17)*** 0.83 (0.54)
GDP 0.0006(0.0002) 0.0006 (0.0002)** 0.0006(0.0002***) 0.0006 (0.0002)**
Dummy MNE -0.41(1.02) -0.81 (1.03) -0.41(1.03) -0.81 (1.32)
Dummy years yes yes yes yes
Dummy sectors yes yes yes yes
DEM*years no yes no yes
Fixed effects C13 C13 C13 C13
Tests:
Hausman Test (χ2) 20.88 83.29***
F-test: fixed vs pooled 4.50*** 4.62***
D. Years=0 3.87*** 0.28 1.7 105*** 1.7 105***
D. Sectors=0 3.18*** 3.11*** 1.8 105*** 2.6 105***
DEM*year=0 1.14 268***
σu 27.50 28.03 27.50 28.03
ρ 0.72 0.73 0.72 0.73
Robustness errors Heterosk. Heterosk Clusters Clusters
R-Square (within) 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.50
OBS 1614 1614 1614 1614
Groups 13 13 13 13
*** 1% significance level; ** 5%; * 10%
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Table 11
Econometric results: One-contract firms
Method of estimation: Pooled OLS, Value in brackets: Std Error,
Dependent variable: IV
OLS OLS
C 14.75 (6.9)** 8.38(7.56)
IP 0.15 (0.02)*** 0.15(0.02)***
PUBLIC 8.12(2.71)*** 8.00(2.75)***
Dem -0.21(0.19) dropped
Libor -1.78 (0.73)** 0.32(0.92)
GDP 0.0004(0.0003) 0.0004(0.0003)
Dummy years yes yes
Dummy sectors yes yes
DEM*years no yes
Tests:
D. Years=0 2.61*** 0.89
D. Sectors=0 4.47*** 3.20***
DEM*year=0 1.55*
DEM*year=D. Years
Robustness errors Heterosk. Heterosk
Adj. R-Square 0.51 0.51
OBS 1269 1269
*** 1% significance level; ** 5%; * 10%
44
Table 12
Econometric results: One-contract firms
Method of estimation: Fixed effects, Value in brackets: Std Error,
Dependent variable: IV
Fixed effects Fixed effects
C 14.7 (6.77)** -8.78 (-0.57)
IP 0.16 (0.02)*** 0.15(0.006)***
PUBLIC 7.19 (2.72)*** 7.12 (2.04)***
Dem -0.14 (0.19) dropped
Libor -2.03(0.70)*** 3.94 (2.82)
GDP 0.0005(0.0003) 0.0004 (0.0003)
Dummy years yes yes
Dummy sectors yes yes
DEM*years no yes
Fixed effects C13 C13
Tests:
Hausman Test (χ2) 11.20** 17.18***
F-test: fixed vs pooled 4.33*** 4.57***
D. Years=0 3.03*** 0.98
D. Sectors=0 2.02*** 1.73**
DEM*year=0 1.82**
σu 27.75 28.63
ρ 0.70 0.71
Robustness errors Heterosk. Heterosk
R-Square (within) 0.48 0.49
OBS 1265 1265
Groups 13 13
*** 1% significance level; ** 5%; * 10%
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Table 13
Econometric results: One-contract firms
Sector: Banking and Finance
Method of estimation: Fixed effects, Value in brackets: Std Error,
Dependent variable: IV
Pooled Pooled Fixed effects Fixed effects
C 5.97 (1.66)*** 5.98 (0.48)*** 3.83(5.08) 3.83 (1.60)**
IP 0.36 (0.06)*** 0.35(0.04)*** 0.35 (0.01)*** 0.35 (0.04)***
PUBLIC 1.16 (3.08) 1.53 (2.00) 1.65 (4.91) 1.65 (2.38)
Dem dropped dropped dropped dropped
Libor -1.95 (0.45)*** -1.93 (0.23)*** -1.51 (1.53) -1.51 (0.42)***
GDP 0.001 (0.0004)** 0.001(0.0003)** 0.001 (0.0002)*** 0.001 (0.0003)**
Dummy years yes yes yes yes
DEM*years yes yes yes yes
Fixed effects C13 C13
Tests:
F-test: fixed vs pooled 3.10**
D. Years=0 3.71*** 36971.4*** 0.89 23106.5***
DEM*year=0 1.35 1144.3*** 1.30 4928.97***
σu 5.74 5.74
ρ 0.22 0.22
Robustness errors Heterosk. Cluster Heterosk Cluster
R-Square (within) 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.58
OBS 582 582 578 578
Groups 8 8
*** 1% significance level; ** 5%; * 10%
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Table 14
Econometric results: Several-contract firms
Method of estimation: Pooled OLS (with error correction), Value in brackets: Std Error,
Dependent variable: IV
OLS OLS OLS
C 14.57 (10.14) 0.44(3.65) 14.57 (7.34)**
IP 0.21 (0.03)*** 0.21(0.03)*** 0.22 (0.032)***
PUBLIC 1.96 (4.11) 1.97 (4.06) 1.96 (0.62)
Dem dropped -0.19(0.19) dropped
Libor -5.58 (4.42) 0.67 (1.18) -5.58 (3.04)*
GDP 0.0007 (0.0004)* 0.0007 (0.0004)** 0.0007 (0.0004)*
IPDSY 0.34 (0.12)*** 0.32 (0.11)*** 0.34 (0.12)***
Dummy years yes yes yes
Dummy sectors yes yes yes
DEM*years yes no yes
Tests:
D. Years= 0 1.81* 0.69 2.07**
D. Sectors=0 3.30*** 4.20*** 2.99***
DEM*year=0 1.62* 2.16**
DEM*year=D. Years 1.85* 3.06***
Robustness errors Heterosk Heterosk Cluster
Adj. R-Square 0.65 0.64 0.65
OBS 346 346 346
*** 1% significance level; ** 5%; * 10%
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Table 15
Econometric results: Several-contract firms
Method of estimation: Fixed effects (with error correction ), Value in brackets: Std Error,
Dependent variable: IV
Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects
C 1.43 (10.39) -2.84 (4.95) 13.43 (7.60)*
IP 0.21 (0.03)*** 0.21 (0.03)*** 0.21 (0.03)***
PUBLIC 1.14 (4.57) 1.37 (4.50) 1.14(4.36)
Dem dropped -0.11(0.21) dropped
Libor -5.34(4.43) 0.85 (1.22) -5.34 (3.04)*
GDP 0.0009(0.0004)** 0.001 (0.0004)** 0.0009(0.0004*)
IPDSY 0.34 (0.12)*** 0.32 (0.11)*** 0.34 (0.11)***
Dummy years yes yes yes
Dummy sectors yes yes yes
DEM*years yes no yes
Fixed effects ct13 ct13 ct13
Tests:
Hausman Test (χ2) 18.32***
F-test: fixed vs pooled 1.85* 1.65
D. Years= 0 1.7* 0.51 2.05**
D. Sectors=0 3.15*** 4.42*** 3.22***
DEM*year=0 1.68* 2.42***
DEM*year=D. Years 1.49 2.81***
σu 4.21 3.20 4.21
ρ 0.12 0.07 0.12
Robustness errors Heterosk. Heterosk Cluster
R-Square (within) 0.48 0.64 0.65
OBS 344 344 344
Groups 8 8 8
*** 1% significance level; ** 5%; * 10%
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Table 16
Econometric results: Several-contract firms
Method of estimation: Fixed effects (with error correction), Value in brackets: Std Error,
Dependent varibale: IV
Fixed effects Fixed effects
C 22.51 (9.04)** 22.51 (7.00)**
IP 0.21 (0.03)*** 0.21 (0.03)***
PUBLIC 1.11(4.03) 1.11(3.87)
Dem dropped dropped
Libor -6.40 (3.68)* -6.40 (2.65)**
GDP 0.0008(0.0004)* 0.0008(0.0004)*
IPDSY 0.38 (0.12)*** 0.38 (0.12)***
Dummy years yes yes
Dummy sectors yes yes
DEM*years yes yes
Fixed effects C13FIRST C13FIRST
Tests:
Hausman Test (χ2) na2
F-test: fixed vs pooled 2.73*
D. Years= 0 2.27** 2.73***
D. Sectors=0 3.09*** 2.80***
DEM*year=0 1.93** 3.02***
DEM*year=D. Years 2.11** 4.30***
σu 5.51 5.51
ρ 0.19 0.19
Robustness errors Heterosk Cluster
Adj. R-Square 0.66 0.66
OBS 346 346
Groups 8 8
*** 1% significance level; ** 5%; * 10%
2We experienced problems in running this test with this fixed effect either in the current and the reduced form. The variable (CT2PPRR)
contain a big mass of zero values and, hence, the fitted model fails to meet the asympothic assumption of the Hausman test.
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Table 17
Econometric results: Second and further contracts
Method of estimation: Pooled OLS, Value in brackets: Std Error,
Dependent variable: IV
OLS OLS OLS OLS
C -3.14 (4.40) -5.06(2.47)* -1.85(7.96) 3.36 (7.57)
IP 0.20(0.03)*** 0.19 (0.28)*** 0.194 (0.03)*** 0.19 (0.03)***
PUBLIC -1.92(5.85) -2.00 (8.85) -3.45 (6.48) -3.25 (9.05)
Dem -0.59 (0.25)** -0.60 (0.42) dropped dropped
Libor 2.26 (0.59)*** 2.26 (0.56)** 1.93 (2.48) 1.93 (0.79)***
GDP 0.001 (0.0006)** 0.001(0.0002)*** 0.001 (0.0007)* 0.001 (0.0001)***
Dummy years yes yes yes yes
Dummy sectors yes yes yes yes
DEM*years no no yes yes
Tests:
D. Years=0 6.21*** 6.70** 2.98*** 18.71***
D. Sectors=0 4.78*** 2.74 2.20*** 14.09***
DEM*year=0 2.82*** 12.49***
DEM*year=D. Years 5.45*** 22.06***
Robustness errors Heterosk. Cluster Heterosk. Cluster
Adj. R-Square 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.59
OBS 191 191 191 191
*** 1% significance level; ** 5%; * 10%
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Table 18
Econometric results: Second and further contracts
Method of estimation: Fixed effects, Value in brackets: Std Error,
Dependent variable: IV
Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects
C -3.65 (17.63) 2.99 (11.94) 98.91(26.82)***
IP 0.19 (0.017)*** 0.19(0.02)*** 0.63(0.20)***
PUBLIC -5.99 (6.98) -4.07 (6.56) -20.50 (6.84)***
Dem dropped dropped dropped
Libor 1.90 (2.42) 1.42 (2.33) -2.45 (1.41)*
GDP 0.002 (0.0006)** 0.001 (0.0006)** -0.003 (0.002)
Dummy years yes yes yes
Dummy sectors yes yes yes
DEM*years yes yes yes
Fixed effects C13 C13FIRST IPFIRST
Tests:
F-test: fixed vs pooled 0.94 3.27*** 4.42***
D. Years=0 0.84 2.23** 2.56**
D. Sectors=0 0.64 1.79** 7.35***
DEM*year=0 0.86 2.11** 11.11***
DEM*year=D. Years 0.72 2.86** 9.80***
σu 3.32 15.49 76.23
ρ 0.07 0.64 0.99
Robustness errors Heterosk. Heterosk Heterosk
R-Square (within) 0.59 0.60 0.81
OBS 190 190 179
Groups 6 7 91
*** 1% significance level; ** 5%; * 10%
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Table 19
Econometric results: Second and further contracts in the Banking and Finance sector
Method of estimation: Fixed effects, Value in brackets: Std Error,
Dependent variable: IV
Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects
C -2.58(6.87) -0.52(6.40) 5.25(8.04)
IP 0.33 (0.034)*** 0.32(0.03)*** 0.73(0.06)***
PUBLIC dropped dropped dropped
Dem dropped dropped dropped
Libor 1.67 (2.31) 1.03 (2.18) -1.71 (2.55)
GDP 0.001 (0.0006)* 0.001 (0.0006)* -0.002 (0.001)*
Dummy years yes yes yes
DEM*years yes yes yes
Fixed effects C13 C13FIRST IPFIRST
Tests:
F-test: fixed vs pooled 0.81 3.76*** 5.41***
D. Years=0 0.55 0.76 1.62
DEM*year=0 0.55 0.61 2.44**
σu 5.27 13.72 26.71
ρ 0.17 0.61 0.94
Robustness errors Heterosk. Heterosk Heterosk
R-Square (within) 0.55 0.60 0.81
OBS 141 138 129
Groups 6 7 58
*** 1% significance level; ** 5%; * 10%
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Table 20
Econometric results: Second and further contracts in the Banking and Finance sector
Subsample: Native firms
Method of estimation: Fixed effects, Value in brackets: Std Error,
Dependent variable: IV
Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects
C -2.58(6.87) -1.68(4.54) 13.62 (9.30) 0.52 (2.70) -1.68 (1.97) 13.62 (10.04)
IP 0.80 (0.046)*** 0.77(0.05)*** 0.58(0.06)*** 0.80 (0.15)*** 0.77 (0.17)*** 0.58 (0.23)**
PUBLIC dropped dropped dropped dropped dropped dropped
Dem dropped dropped dropped dropped dropped dropped
Libor 0.32 (1.60) 0.08 (1.59) -2.67 (2.61) 0.32 (0.74) 0.08 (1.09) -2.67 (1.30)**
GDP 0.005 (0.0006) 0.007 (0.0006) -0.003 (0.001)** 0.005 (0.006) 0.0007 (0.0004) -0.003 (0.001)**
Dummy years yes yes yes yes yes yes
DEM*years yes yes yes yes yes yes
Fixed effects C13 C13FIRST IPFIRST C13 C13FIRST IPFIRST
Tests:
F-test: fixed vs pooled 0.12 1.06 1.93**
D. Years=0 3.92*** 17.51*** 1.32 7.08 E07*** 380.37*** 14.99***
DEM*year=0 16.36*** 12.43*** 1.86* 1.4 E07*** 18.63*** 301.80***
σu 74.9 7.17 19.87 74.99 7.17 19.87
ρ 0.99 0.48 0.91 0.98 0.48 0.91
Robustness errors Heterosk. Heterosk Heterosk Cluster Cluster Cluster
R-Square (within) 0.83 0.82 0.75 0.83 0.82 0.75
OBS 115 112 111 115 112 111
Groups 6 7 53 6 7 53
*** 1% significance level; ** 5%; * 10%
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A Appendix: List of sectors
The following table shows all the sectors that firms asking for a finance belong to:
Banking, Finance and holding Local services (water, waste...)
Chemical (including Pharmaceutical) Media
Education and other public services Manufacturing
Electronic and Hi-Tech Metal
Energy Natural resources
Environment Oil and gas
Food and beverage (incl. agriculture) Real estate
Health and personal care Telecommunication
Hotels and tourism Trade and retail
Infrastructure (transport) Vehicles
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